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Toward a Theory of the History 
of Representational Technologies 
Recent interest in the technology of representational media, coupled 
with a growing concern to theorize cinema history, has made it possi-
ble, finally, to contemplate a history of representational technolo-
gies/ l. While recent criticism has succeeded in opening this new 
territory, however, it has simultaneously staked out claims and esta-
blished practices "".hich threaten to close off this fertile area before it 
can be permanently and intelligently settled. The problems which these 
recent efforts have encountered are instructive in themselves, however. 
Careful consideration of three such problems will lead me here to a new 
hypothesis regarding the history of representational technologies. 
1. Technique/Technology 
Jean-Louis Comolli can hardly be made to carry the full responsabi-
lity for the general tendency of cinema theorists to conflate the concepts 
of technique and technology (though his« Technique et ldeologie » is to 
be sure complicitous in this affair). The three languages which contri-
bute most regularly to the realm of cinema theory ,-English, French, 
and German- are already marked by a certain confusion in those 
terms derived from the Greek techne (skill, art, or craft). In English, the 
adjective « technical » refers alternately to technique and to technology, 
while the noun, «technician» has come to replace the more logical 
«technologist» to designate someone who works with technology. 
/ I. Jean-Louis Comolli's landmark 1971-72 essay «Technique et ldeologie» 
( Cahiers du Cinema 229, 4-21 ; 230, 51-57; 231, 42-49; 233, 39-45; 234-S, 94-100; 241, 
2().24) is followed by Ron Burnett,• Film/Technology/Ideology». Cine-tracts I, 1977, 
6,.14; Edward Branigan, «Color and Cinema: Problems in the Writing of History »1in Allan Almendarez, Lafferty, eds., Film Reader 4, Evanston, Northwestern univ., 
1979 • 16,.34; Charles H. Harpole, «Ideological and Technological Determinism in 
Deep-Space Cinema Images: Issues in Ideology, Technological His!O(Y, and Aesthe-
tics», Film Quater/y 33, no. 3, Spring 1980, 11-22; Tere~a,de Lauretls and Sl<:P.hen 
Heath. eds. The Cinematic Apparatus, New York, S' Martins Press~ 1980. Inadd1tmn, 
the work of Patrick Ogle. Douglas Gomery. and William Lafferty deserves to be cited. 
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French tends to use the single term «technique» to designate the entire 
range of meanings. German is still more perverse, often using «Techno-
logie » to mean technique and « Technik » to mean technology /2. This 
potential confusion has been further compounded by the choice of 
deep-focus photography as the major proving ground of theories regar-
d ind the relationship between technology and history, for the produc-
tion of a deep-focus image -like many other filmic phenomena-
depends on a combination of technical and technological concerns. 
While technological changes in the late thirties (availability of new 
lenses) make deep-focus photography easier and more economical to 
achieve, anyone who has ever used a camera knows that a depth-of-
focus choice must be made every time the shutter is tripped. The 
difference between an exposure made at f 5.6with a speed of l /250and 
another made at f 16with a speed of l/ 30 isa question of technique, not 
of technology ; the latter image may be a deep-focus image, the former 
cannot possible be. Indeed, given sufficient light, a cameraman and 
director may choose to treat any shot with great depth of focus, with or 
without the technological changes commonly associated with deep 
focus. It is thus hardly surprising to find that articles which touch on 
the topic of deep-focus photography characteristically alternate bet-
ween technical and technological concerns without making any distinc-
tion whatsoever between the two. 
So what? one might well ask. Why so much commotion over a 
simple question of vocabulary? Precisely because, I would claim, this is 
no simple question of vocabulary, but a fundamental problem in the 
theory of history. As we clearly see from the example of deep-focus 
photography, the basic configuration is this: when the same result is 
produced by two recognizably different causes, then critics feel justified 
m conflating the terms habitually employed to distinguish one of those 
causes from the other. When we scratch this simple surface we find a 
logical application of one of the ground rules of semiotic analysis, 
namely commutation: if substitution of one sound unit (or constituent 
sense unit) for another makes no difference to the meaning (or higher-
level sense unit), then we say that the language (or text) recognizes no 
difference in the alternate units. Following this reasoning, a generation 
of film historians has taken technique and technology to be interchan-
geable notions because they yield similar results. This easy transferral 
of methodology from synchronic semiotic analysis to the discourse of 
history simply will not do. We must learn to use the familiar commuta-
tion test in a different way when we come to practice history. Whereas 
/2. This confusion is especially evident in the work of Adorno. See Miriam Hansen, 
« Introduction to Adorno, 'Transparencies on Film' (1966) >>, New German Critique 
24-25. Fall-Winter 1981-82, 186-205. 
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synchronic analysis quite properly takes similarity of effect or sense as 
an indicator of functional identity, history refuses the hypothesis of 
synchrony and thus must begin its analysis by recognizing that diffe-
rent causes may produce the same effect. Instead of erasing difference 
in the name of functional identity, history must ask a different series of 
questions. Under what circumstances does one cause produce the effect 
in question? Under what circumstances the other? What relationship 
obtains between the two? 
In short, to conflate the notions of technique and technology is to 
destroy the possibility of understanding technical/technological his-
tory in a fully dialectical manner. If the two domains are taken to be 
coterminous and ultimately identical, then their effect on each other 
will necessarily remain invisible to our analysis. This would be espe· 
cially regrettable given the importance of the technique/technology 
dialectic throughout the history of representation. It is certainly no 
secret, for example, that one of the prime 1t1overs of technological 
development lies in the economic interest of automatizing (i.e. reducing 
the production time of) those techniques which have become consecra-
ted by tradition. Even before the industrial revolution and its camera, 
the Renaissance had produced numerous contraptions assuring « An 
Easy Method of Representing Natural Objects According to the Rules 
of Perspective», as the French Jesuit Jean Dubreuil would have it/ 3. In 
fact, throughout the history of the camera, this automatization of 
accepted technique by new technology continues the operate. During 
the 1840s, standard procedure called for the photographer to immobi-
lize his client with a head brace. By the end of the century, rapid film 
stock had transferred the process of immobilizing the subject from an 
accepted photographer's technique to an automatic part of photogra-
phic technology. A similar analysis would show how the development 
of directional ·microphones in the 1930s consecrated -and 
automatized- persistent attempts throughout the early years of sound 
cinema to limit and concentrate the range of existing mikes/4. 
/ 3. lt is from this work that the frontispiece of Como!H·s first installment is drawn. In 
passing it is perhaps worth noting that ComoUi truncates the plate, removing the 
separate dose-ups of the devlces which make it possible for the depicted painter to 
produce a perspective drawing automatically. In other words, Comolli's version seems 
to rcfor to the technique of perspective alone, while the complete drawing clearly refers 
to the te{;hnologizing of that technique as well. {See page 110 for a reproduction of the 
comp1ete engraving). 
J 4. It is interesting to note similarity between Gomery's proposed stages of technolo-
gical deployment and the common pattern outlined he.re. Whereas Gomerts first stage 
(invention) is largely technological, however. mine recognizes the possibility of inven-
tion thrnugh technique. In dealing with the technologization of technique~ however, I 
do recognize the same economic impulse that characterizes the move from invention to 
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« The structure of representation is thus that of an infinite mise~en~abymet with the new 
apparatus having to represent the 0Id1 itself representing the previous one. and so on}>, 
Architecture represented by painting represented by engraving represented by book 
illustration represented by photocopy represented by journal illustration. (As presen* 
ted in Beaumont Newhall's History of Photography. New York, Museum of Modern 
Art, 1980). 
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A dialectical understanding of the relationship between technique 
and technology opens up a broad range of possible connections.Just as 
technology often automatizes an aceepted technique, so new techni-
ques often appear in reaction to -indeed in compensation for- the 
introduction of the technologies. Consider the common thirties prac-
tice of aiming the mike at the floor, adopted to recover an omnidirectio-
nality lost with the advent of directional microphones. A similar 
compensatory attempt leads directors in the fifties to break down the 
wide Cinemascope screen into two or three sections, each of which 
permits composition in a field more nearly similar to that of the 
familiar I: 1.33 frame. The industry's use of stereo for dialogue involves 
the same dialectic once again. Traditional miking techniques, when 
applied to the new stereo technology, tend to confuse the viewer, for 
from shot to shot the same character's voice may move about in the new 
sound space created by stereo. The simple solution to this quandary, 
already operative in the late fifties and adopted today by nearly all users 
of the Dolby system, is to record dialogue monaurally and to run it 
either through the .center speaker alone, or through the center speaker 
at full volume with the same signal down a few decibels through the 
appropriate side speaker. Once again, history appears through the 
dialectic of technique and technology, a dialectic which can be fully 
appreciated only by the historian who maintains the distinction. This is 
of course not to say that the distinction is always easy to make in 
practice {e.g. the mid-nineteenth-century use of a head brace to secure 
sharp focus combines a new technology -the brace itself- and a new 
technique- the decision to use the brace for some subjects and not for 
others). Nor does the technique/technology couple have any privileged 
status which might give it priority over such pairings as technique/sub-
ject matter or technology /economics. The important thing to remenber 
is that a dialectical understanding of history 1s destroyed from the start 
by any theory which reduces to one those practices that interact as two. 
2. Basic apparatus/ Historical apparatus 
In many ways, descriptive cinema theory of the seventies takes up 
where prescriptive theory left off in 1930. Concerned to preserve cine-
matic purity from the threat of «theatrical» sound, Clair, Eisenstein, 
Arnheim and others reflected for a limited but intense period on the 
question of cinematic specificity. The seventies revived this concern in 
the form of speculation on the ideological and/or psychoanalytical 
ramifications of cinema's basic apparatus. The influential work of 
Jean-Louis Comolli thus appears in the broader context of work by 
Pleynet, Baudry, and Metz on the topic ofcinematic specificity. Widely 
admired and imitated, this strain of criticism has never to my know-
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ledge been subjected to any of the fundamental criticisms to which its 
basic strategy opens it/ 5. 
While repeatedly criticizing Bazin for his unilinear realist view of 
cinema history, Comolli nervertheless regularly reiterates two telltale 
phrases which reveal his own conception of cinema history as a unified, 
straight-line affair. From the very beginning of his long study, in an 
introductory section entitled « The ideological place of the 'basic appa-
ratus'», Comolli borrows from Marcelin Pleynet the notion that 
cinema «inherits» (I, 6) the code of Renaissance perspective, a notion 
which implies the fundamental identity of the perspective practiced in 
the Italian fifteeth century with that which characterizes the standard 
cinema camera (the question of sound perspective never being brought 
into play). Indeed, this assumption is perfectly consonant with Comol-
li's insistence on «the patient accumulation of technical processes» 
whereby cinema has carried out the ideology's bidding (V, 98). Again, 
the notion of «patient accumulation» implies a lack of contradiction 
among all the processes so accumulated. Overall, adoption of this 
additive approach to cinema history brings Comolli back surprisingly 
close to the model for which he chides Bazin. Because its « basic 
apparatus» doesn't change, cinema is by definition throughout its 
history fundamentally self-identical. 
Curiously, in another part of his study Comolli himself provides the 
counter-argument to this proposition .. The third installment devotes a 
long passage to the questionable practice of seeking out historical 
«firsts» (close-up, pan, iris, etc.). Criticizing Mitry's search for the first 
close-up, Comolli states : « No necessary equivalence links the close-up 
of 1913 to those of 1960 because the relevant element of opposition is 
not the parameter of enlargment in shots, but the network of diffe-
rences between the forces which determine two different moments of 
film practice. These differences specifically preclude constituting 
«close-up» (or traveling shots, etc.) into an historical chain and setting 
them all on the same level. By founding the close-up in this way Mi try 
effaces the scene of contrr1dictions where the conditions of cinemafo· 
graphic significance are played out and erects instead an autonomous 
series of technical processes : these teclJniques, once «invented», syste-
matized and enthroned by some pioneer (whose practice for this very 
reason is not necessarily connected to that of later filmmakers)Jorever 
remain what they were on first appearance, available once andfor all, 
usable universally and out of time abstract molds whose nature, 
function and meaning do not change» (lll,47). 
The argument is· well stated indeed. Surprinsingly Saussurean in his 
/5. I have, however, benefitted greatly from reading an unpublished paper by NoBI 
Carroll on «The Specificity of Media and the Arts,>. 
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reasoning, Comolli introduces through the notion of« contradiction» 
the principle of excluded meanings on which semiotic analysis is based. 
Because two «close-ups» enter into differing sets of contradictions in 
different periods (Le. exist in a context of different excluded meanings, 
invoke different background sets), they may not properly be said to 
derive from the same category of expression. But if this is the case, then 
on what grounds does Comolli recognize perspective across the ages as 
the «same» thing 7 Indeed, the very notion of a « basic » apparatus of 
cinema itself is compromised (quite rightly, I believe) by this argument. 
Two important consideration are at stake here. First, there is the 
fundamental question of the historicity of cinema itself, along with its 
basic apparatus. Strikingly, Comolli himself argues that our notion of 
« basic apparatus » needs to be broadened from Baudry's identification 
of the apparatus with the camera and projector alone, yet he never 
seems to realize that this very argument compromises the possible 
existence of an apparatus basic enough to be self-identical from decade 
to decade. If Comolli can by argument (or if Hollywwod can be 
introducing soundJ change the definition of the basic apparatus, then 
just how much force can the term « basic »retain? Second, as in the case 
of the technique/technology conflation, continu.ed adherence to the 
notion of an a historical« basic» apparatus robs us of the opportunity 
to consider the development of cinema technology dialectically. 
Notions of inheritance and patient accumulation leave little room for 
an understanding of history which is process-oriented and which res-
pects the semiotic notion of excluded meanings, itself an underexploi-
ted but powerful! tool in support of a dialectical approach to history. 
What would a non-additive approach to technology look like? How 
might we write history, all the while respecting the notion that not even 
the apparatus itself is independent, of history ? In order to answer these 
questions I can do no better than to offer as an example of the type of 
reading fostered by the principles enunciated above a hypothetical 
account of the beginnings of perspective itself. Borrowing Pleynet's 
term, Comolli asserts that cinema «inherits» the code of perspective 
from painting. Whereas some would see an important difference or 
even a contradiction between the notion of perspective as a technique 
and perspective as embedded in a technology, Como Iii sees only conti-
nuity. Faithful to an incremental logic, Comolli simply treats each new 
state as adding something to the previous one: cinema adds an automa-
tic quality to painting in the same way that a new fi!mstock adds color 
or an additional track adds sound. If we move back to the« beginning», 
however, to the initial development on which cinema depends, to what 
can we say that perspective is added? Is perspective simply an inscruta-
ble point of origin 7 Is it added to something else? 
· The master art of the early middle ages, as Henri Focillon tells us, 
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was architecture/6. Sculpture, painting, mosaic, and all the so-called 
decorative arts gained their right to exist, their meaning, and even their 
physical support from architecture. Sculpture was thus rarely free-
standing but rather an integral part of an architectural edifice, while 
painting was most commonly an ancillary art, regularly applied to 
three-dimensi,;mal elements of architectural design, sculpture, or orna-
ment. Yet, because it was applied to three-dimensional surfaces, much 
of the « flat », monochrome painting of the Romanesque period easily, 
indeed automatically, represented depth, roundness, and a broad spec-
trum of shade\;! tones. But suppose that, for whatever reason, one were 
to transfer the locus of painting from the three-dimensional aspects of 
architecture to the flat wall between (fresco painting) and from there to 
movable panels or canvases meant to be hung on tho.se flat walls. (easel 
painting), what then? From a three-dimensional art, painting would be 
reduced to two. The invention of perspective would then be anything 
but an addition to a previous art, it would be a reaction against the 
previous art, a compensation through technique for losses sustained in 
the transition from one support to another, from one technology to 
another, from one apparatus to another. Take three-dimensionality 
away from painting, i.e. take away from painting the support which 
serves as the early middle ages' guarantee of reality, and we find 
painting imitating that support, attempting by some geometric black 
magic to recreate three dimensions out of two - and in so doing 
constantly depicting the architectural monuments, forms, and spaces 
which made up the earlier support. The excluded element, present by its 
absence in the early history of wall, panel, and easel painting, is thus the 
three-dimensional architectural support. By the time cinema automa-
tizes perspective half a millennium later, there is of course no longer 
any such excluded element ; instead there is the significant absence of 
the immobility of subjects which nineteeth-century photography had 
labored so hard to obtain. 
Though these are but two hypothetical moments in the history of 
perspective -the invention of perspeetive and its automatization in 
cinema- their differences clearly exemplify the historicity of perspec-
tive in relationship to its apparatus, i.e. the non-identity of perspective 
from one historical situation to another. In addition, by placing the 
apparatus within history, we provide a buffer between technological or 
technical change and the ideology which Comolli would invoke to 
explain that change. Instead of relating each change directly to a single 
set of ideological forces (which in Comolli often appear insufficiently 
various and differentiated, thus corresponding all too well to his uni-
/6. Henri Focillon, La vie desformes, Paris, Presses universitaires de France. 1942. 
Nouvelle edition1 Paris, Presses Universitaire de France, coJI. Quadrige, 198 l. 
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fied notion of perspective over the ages), we are encouraged by histori· 
cal analysis of the apparatus to recognize as varied that which from an 
ontological standpoint appears unified. This is of course by no means 
precludes an ideological explanation of technological change. It only 
means that such an explanation will necessarily relate to the apparatus 
as it changes in history, and not to some putative «basic» apparatus 
which has no historical existence. 
3. Codes of representation/ Codes of reality 
However much Comolli's general statements may imply recognition 
of a single basic apparatus, his long analysis of the introduction of 
panchromatic film stock in the late twenties reveals. a willingness to 
historify technological change in something other than a purely linear, 
additive manner. By looping back to a «previous» apparatus -
photography- in establishing the historical context for the introduc-
tion of panchro, Comolli poses the otherwise absent question of the 
relationship among representational technologies, thus opening the 
way toward a more general theory of representation as it relates to and 
is conveyed by apparatuses located in history. The remainder of this 
sectio~ sketches out such a theory. 
lnlt~amous essay on « The Ontology of the Photographic Image», 
Andre Bazin identifies the « mummy complex » which lies at the origin 
of representatlqnal art. The king dies. In order not to lose him comple-
tely, the priests make a death mask of his face. The king goes to his 
tomb, but the people retain a representation of his features. The king is 
dead; long live the «king». Art was thus born, Bazin suggests, as «the 
preservation of life by a representation of life »/7. As a theory of 
re-present-ation, Bazin's analysis stresses the extent of which all repre-
sentation is an attempt to compensate for the loss of something which is 
no longer present, from a deceased sovereign or loved one to the distant 
monument of which one brings home a postcard souvenir. Stressing the 
relatively uncoded iconic mode of representation, Bazin constantly 
plays up the relationship between the representation and the represen-
ted. Comolli, on the other hand, devotes his attention to analysis of the 
representation itself, revealing its complex coding and its methods of 
binding the spectator into a particular ideology. A propos of Bazin's 
death mask he might well have pointed out the conventional reasons 
for choosing to preserve the face (rather than, say, the arm pit), with its 
implied function as window to the soul, or the implications of casting 
the mask in a particular precious metal, symbol of royalty and durabi-
/7. Andre Bazin, «Ontologie de !'Image photographique». in Qu'est-ce•que le 
cinema. Paris, Editions du Cerf. 1981. pp. 9-17. 
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lity. From this point of view the seemingly uncoded nature of the iconic 
mode nevertheless offers up its potentially complex coding. It is this 
coding that ensures a sense of reality for the spectator while at the same 
time bonding that spectator to an ideological position. 
On the one side, then, the real ; on the other side its representation -
less coded for Bazin, more coded for Comolli ; leaving Bazin's specta-
tor at liberty, ·invisibly binding Comolli's. To my mind Comolli's 
position is a significant gain over the Bazinian stance, yet from another 
point of view the two critics are surprisingly similar in their views. In 
both cases the real, that which is represented, appears as a natural fact 
and not as a coded construct. To be sure, Comolli discusses at length 
the codes which identify a representation as successfully representing 
the real, but he never shows the least concern for the codes which mark 
the real as real. The panchromatic film stock example might well have 
permitted him to do so, but instead of identifying the photographic 
codes with which cinema aligns itself as part of the code of reality to 
which cinema must conform, he treats the photographic codes as a new 
component of the code of representation. As in the case of the coming 
of sound, cinematic technology is seen as responding directly and 
nearly automatically to some new ideological development. 
Yet the real is no less coded than representation. Let us take the 
extreme example, already evoked, of perspective painting. It seems that 
the rise of perspective corresponds to a desire to imitate the three 
dimensions of nature on a two-dimensional plane. Yet where is it said 
that nature has three dimensions? And why is it that the earliest 
perspective paintings are nearly without exception of religious subjects, 
usually including architectural decor? From Giotto to Lorenzetti, the 
pioneers of perspective always refer to the reality that is coded by their 
world. Actions have reality to the extent that they are recognizable as 
deriving from a limited number of accepted texts; building have reality 
to the extent that they appear to possess the three dimensions which can 
be traced back to the Temple in Jerusalem; people have reality to the 
extent that the culture ascribes to them that reality. Thus Virtue and 
Vice exist, as do Good Government and Bad Government, but indivi-
dual portraits and townscapes of Siena as Siena will have to wait a 
century. Well known individuals and cities may serve as models for 
disciples or principles, but only later will their success as representa-
tions depend on the personal resemblance rather than resemblance to a 
well coded, previously established category (at which time the very 
notion of« personal resemblance» will be subjected to a coding particu-
lar to its age). 
But what difference does it make that reality should be coded? And 
what is the source of that coding? The answer to the latter question is 
obvious and would no doubt have occurred to Comolli had he not 
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limited his attention almost entirely to a single expression of Western 
ideology. Only by stressing perspective nearly exclusively is Comolli 
able to make the history of Western apparatuses from the Quattrocento 
to the tw�ntieth ce�tury seem _to nearly s_traight:li_ne. For if each appa­
ratus defines a particular version of reality, cod1f1es the systems requi­
red for successful representation, thus establishing the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for representing the real, then we must conclude 
that each apparatus establishes the code of reality to which the subse­
quent apparatus must adhere. Perspective painting imitates architec­
ture and sacred narrative, for those are the privileged apparatus 
-Focillon's master art- of the early middle ages. With panchromatic
film and the addition of sound, film is responding to the definition of
reality propounded by its three most immediate predecessors and early
competitors - photography, radio and the theater. In order to repre­
sent properly, each new technology must therefore succeed in represen­
ting not reality itself, but the version of reality established by a
previously dominant representational technology.
In other words; there is no such thing as representation of the real ; 
there is only representation of representation. For anything that we 
would represent is already constructed as a representation. The struc­
ture of representation is thus that of an infinite mise-en-abyme, with the 
new apparatus having to represent the old, itself representing the 
previous one, and so on. Each new apparatus might thus be likened to a 
translation. Expressive of an ideology different from that of the former 
apparatus, the ·new apparatus must simultaneously find a way to 
express that new ideology and -in the same words, as it were-seem to 
be expressing the old. For only with this appearance of translation can 
the new apparatus be taken as representing the real. The new system 
must thus -at least provisionally- speak with two voices or risk 
failure. It must sound like the old, and yet be new. When a change of 
apparatus appears to involve nothing more than an addition to the old, 
as in the case of sound film, the operation is carried out with little help 
from the techniques deployed by the texts for which the new apparatus 
serves as vehicle. When the change of apparatus is as radical as the 
move from architectural three-dimensional painting to a flat surface, 
then only by extraordinary technical developments, like that of pers­
pective, can the new apparatus retain its right to representation. 
Now the process of translation, as everyone knows, can never pre­
iend to complet�n�ss. From _the very fact that each language is an 
independent sem10t1c system, 1t would appear that every translation is 
by definition partial. Part of the message may be retained, but part will 
also be left behind. This essential characteristic is perfectly visible in the 
development of photography. In order for a photograph to serve as an 
adequate representation in nineteeth-century Europe, it had to satisfy 
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the codes of the real developed by painting and drawing; that is it 
required a strong iconic resemblance, a sense of depth, and a treatment 
of light consonant with that depth, as well as a certain palette of colors. 
But a photograph also had to satisfy the codes of representation 
imposed by an industrialized bourgeoisie; that is it must require mini-
mal human talent, it must be produced mechanically, and it must be of 
such a size and durability to encourage rapid and continuous sales to a 
large group of modest customers (as opposed to the small group of rich 
customers associated with painting). Photography succeeded because, 
with one exception, it satisfied the (previous) codes of reality as well as 
the new codes of representation associated with a current ideology. As 
effort went into satisfying the one remaining requirement -color-
further shortcomings were noted, such as lack of durability as compa-
red to painting. But this feature, which appears as a drawback in the 
reality code, turns out to be an advantage in the throwaway market of 
the representational code. Graininess, blurring, lack of depth of focus · 
-all are slowly «corrected» as the century goes by, thus increasingly 
aligning photography with the reality codes of painting. 
The transition from painting to photography might thus be likened 
to an imperfect translation-in-progress. Unable to express exactly the 
reality codes of the preceding medium, photography is characterized by 
a constant effort to make up for this lack. For the lack of color is felt as 
a lack, and not in comparison to nature, but in comparison to painting 
(as well as tinted engraving and other related technologies). As long as 
the new medium appears to society as in some sense competing with the 
old, then the imperfection of the translation becomes a sign within the 
translation itself. In any semiotic system the meaning of a given term is 
defined by its actual syntagmatic relations and its potential paradigma-
tic relations. Now, it might seem that the colorless character of early 
photography remains uncommuted as a textual sign by virtue of the 
absence of a color paradigm in photography, but this would be true 
only in the limits of photography in fact the limits of the signifying 
system in question. In fact, I would claim, the appearance of a new 
apparatus and textual system always introduces a period, which might 
last for days or decades, when the semiotics of the new system must be 
seen as including those of the old system, which it translates. In short, 
the lack in the new system -say color in early photography- must be 
read as a sign in that system even though it appears only by its absence. 
Looked at in another way, color might be considered as a signified 
inherited from the previous system of representation (now serving as 
the new code of reality), but for which the present system provides no 
signifier. This imbalance in the system creates a pressure of two kinds; 
I) to adapt the apparatus so that it can signify in the desired way, and 2) 
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to adapt the texts deployed by the new apparatus to the desired 
signification. 
When cinema was invented, for example, it had at least the photogra-
phic tradition to contend with, itself the representationofarepresenta-
tion and thus encapsulating the remnants of prior systems as well. To 
reduce the problem to its very skeleton, we might say that cinema 
produced a supplement of movement while relinquishing the possessi-
bility of the representation -a trait which photography intensifies as 
compared to the rarer ownership of paintings, which were in turn more 
commonly owned by individuals than the early medieval art work. 
Now cinema adapts to this lack in two ways. First, unable to offer 
possession of the apparatus to the consumer, cinema offers tales of 
possession, the dominant plot concern of early cinema. Second, the 
cinema industry spawns a secondary market of possessible artefacts: 
fan magazines, pictures of stars, autographs, souvenir programs. Only 
with the video medium will it finally become convenient and common 
actually to own one's feature film. 
Indeed, the full-scale quotation of one medium by another (exempli-
fied by the feature film video cassette) leads me to a final point. The 
easiest way to prove that a new medium meets the reality demands 
defined by the old is simply to quote the old, verbatim, as it were. 
Perspective painting quotes architecture, printing quotes speech, early 
printed stories portray oral story-telling, Renaissance theater uses a 
perspective set, early film records theatrical performances, and so on. 
As a special and particularly obvious case ofrepresentation's perpetual 
status as the representation of a representation, these examples remind 
us of the extent to which Octave Mannoni's celebrated description of 
the dynamics of spectatorship apply as well to the dynamics of the 
history of representation. «Je sais bien, says Mannoni, I know that this 
text is only a representation;« mais quand-meme », but still, I have my 
own reasons for believing. The same mechanism operates in the play of 
representational systems. I know that this new medium is not the same 
as the old, but it flatters my needs, it does what I need it to do. In short, 
the reality codes may be slightly off, but the ideology -the representa-
tional code- is right. 
Consider RCA's recent videodisc commercials. We watch a family 
choose which film they want to watch, implying that the magic video-
disc box can quote the film verbatim. Now we know that a reduced-size 
film is not a real film (it's cropped, it has low fidelity, and so forth). But 
we also know that we -as the TV family members are quick to point 
out- are watching the commercial while they are watching their 
chosen film. And so it happens that we come to desire an RCA 
videodisc player. This constant process of quotation and erasure, as 
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Jane Feuer has called it/8, serves alternately to point out the similarities 
between the two media and then to erase them, in the process aligning 
the new representational mode on the old codes ofreality, then offering 
an ideological plus which forever sets the new mode over the old. I 
know it's not a pristine 35mm print, but what the key, there are no 
commercials and I can stop for a beer whenever I want. 
The straight-line model assumed throughout this paper is of course 
used here only for the sake of presentational convenience. There is no 
single straight line from the Ark of the Covenant passing through 
Assisi, Quattrocento perspective painting, Renaissance and neo-
classical theater, photography, cinema, and TI. Instead, there is a 
complex web of constantly changing relationships.among representa-
tional technologies. The challenge of the history of representation, as I 
have sketched is here, is in the task of identifying the return of one 
repressed representational system in another, and thus in observing the 
unceasing pressure to which media subject each other. Seen as a system 
with its own history and internal dynamics, the ideology of representa-
tion opens itself up to the kind of historical analysis in which the system 
itself, once launched, must be seen as retaining a certain life of its own. 
Changes in external ideology occur as pressures on the system, espe-
cially in the form of new codes of representation, but external ideology 
is no longer the only thing driving the system. New ideologies cannot 
simply generate new representational systems without taking into 
account the reality codes established by previous and/ or competing 
representational systems. Once again, we are led to a type of history 
which remains fundamentally dialectical. Instead of seeing a straight 
line between an initial ideological impulse and an ultimate technologi-
cal development (as does Comolli), this new approach considers that 
every ideological force must by necessity grapple with the residue of 
another ideological impetus embodied in competing representational 
modes. To write the history of representational technologies is thus to 
trace the dialectic which grows out of the confrontation between repre-
sentational and reality codes. 
/8. Jane Feuer, The Hollywood Musical, Bloomington, Indiana Univ. Press, 1982. 
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Revenant sur /es rapports technique/ideologie don/ /'analyse avail ete 
initiee en par tie par J. L. Comolli a partir des travaux sur l'apparei/ de 
base de Jean-Louis Baudry et Marcel/in Pleynet, ce texte vise a re­
historiser et a dialectiser ces conceptions qui re/event d'une histoire par 
trop lineaire et accumulative. Revenant sur /'opposition, la plupart du 
temps neutra/isee entre technique et technologie, ii introduit la notion 
d'appareil historique. II etudie la nature des liens non seulement entre 
/es codes de representation et /'appareil de base mais aussi entre celui-ci, 
/es codes de representation et /es codes historiques qui definissent 
/'apprehension de la dite rea/ite. 
